Like Vietnamization, the new China policy had its covert beginnings in the Johnson Administration. A cable from Johnson to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon, which turned up in the Pentagon Papers, is evidence of an earlier recognition in Washington that the Sino-Soviet split might offer useful leverage in power politics. It was dated March 20, 1964, [1] and spelled out the reasons for delaying any open attack on North Vietnam. Johnson added as 'an additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action' that 'we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties soon and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown.'
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