Volume 44, Number 4 · March 6, 1997

Consciousness & the Philosophers

By John R. Searle
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
by David J. Chalmers

Oxford University Press, 414 pp., $29.95

Traditionally in the philosophy of mind there is supposed to be a basic distinction between dualists, who think there are two fundamentally different kinds of phenomena in the world, minds and bodies, and monists, who think that the world is made of only one kind of stuff. Dualists divide into 'substance dualists,' who think that 'mind' and 'body' name two kinds of substances, and 'property dualists,' who think 'mental' and 'physical' name different kinds of properties or features in a way that enables the same substance—a human being, for example—to have both kinds of properties at once. Monists in turn divide into idealists, who think everything is ultimately mental, and materialists, who think everything is ultimately physical or material.



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