It is depressingly familiar: as in the case of America's China policy after 1945, as in Vietnam, ambitious but fuzzy aims are being sought by inadequate means. If the purpose of NATO's bombing of Serbia has been to deter the Serbs from inflicting more harm on the Kosovar Albanians, the policy has failed and we now have to confront the fact that it is, to use the language of strategists, far more difficult to compel the Serbs to get out of Kosovo so that the refugees can return than to deter them—and most unlikely that we will be able to compel them by air warfare alone.
Feature, 2072 words
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