The New York Review of Books

To the Editors:

In his review essay, “Was Alger Hiss Framed?” [NYR, April 1], Professor Allen Weinstein offers the following contentions: “In this review I shall try to show why the new evidence in this case—as well as the old evidence Smith often ignores—demonstrates that the claim [that Hiss was framed] is false and that Hiss has been lying about his relation with Chambers for nearly thirty years.” “But others who once believed in Alger Hiss may now be persuaded [by the new evidence] that he stole the documents in question and that Whittaker Chambers told the truth.” “Long before the FBI files on the case had been opened to me, new evidence had already accumulated to bear out Chambers’s story of his secret activities and his relationship to Hiss.”

In his thoughtful review of John Smith’s book, Professor Weinstein faults the former New York Herald Tribune reporter for failing to consult and consider the available evidence. That same charge applies equally as well to Professor Weinstein’s conclusions in this review essay: not only does the evidence he cites not bear the weight of his conclusions but he has failed to address important questions surrounding this case and to await the complete FBI files bearing on this case. In responding to Weinstein’s review, let me emphasize that my purpose is not simply to take issue with his conclusions. Historians generally tend to disagree when evaluating particular evidence or when posing what they believe to be the most important and relevant questions. Rather, my response has been precipitated by the reaction of the media to the Weinstein review—a front page New York Times story, and Time and Newsweek stories on this review—and their acceptance of his claim to objectivity and that his findings conclusively establish Hiss’s guilt.

It is a rare occasion when historians do not claim objectivity; yet the media’s willingness to accept this claim by Weinstein has been based (1) on his contention that he approached the case objectively, even sympathetically toward Hiss, and reached his conclusions because of the evidence and (2) on the fact that Weinstein’s suit to obtain the Hiss files from the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act has further established his authority and expertise. In this response, let me begin by examining the evidence which Weinstein cites in his review and then note the series of questions which Weinstein neglects to consider and as well his almost total failure to exploit the potentially rich collection of the FBI files.

First, Weinstein refers to Chambers’s November 1938 letters to Solow and to Schapiro in which he (Chambers) admits having warned the Soviet underground (in the words of one of these letters) that he had in his possession “photographic copies of handwritten matters the appearance of which would seriously embarrass them.” Since I have not seen these letters, I shall have to rely on Weinstein’s account as accurately relaying the thrust of Chambers’s position. What does this quote imply? It does not imply that Chambers was threatening to blow an espionage operation, and the reference to copies of “handwritten matters” release of which would “seriously embarrass” Soviet intelligence does not have any direct bearing on the Hiss case. At best, we can conclude that Chambers had preserved a life preserver or wanted his former Communist associates to think that he had.

Second, Weinstein refers to the four Hiss handwritten notes, and particularly the one note wherein Hiss copied exactly a confidential cable sent from Henderson to Hull in January 1938. Weinstein notes that Adolph Berle’s notes of his 1939 meeting with Chambers record that Moscow immediately received a copy of this Henderson report and that an unpublished article which Chambers had written in 1938 records that the Henderson cable was transmitted to Soviet Military Intelligence. What makes this troubling is the fact that Chambers (according to his account) had saved the Hiss notes (and the sixty-five typed pages and the microfilm) as a “life preserver.” Did, then, Chambers transcribe Hiss’s notes and relay his own transcription on to Moscow, keeping Hiss’s note as part of his “life preserver”? One could reach that conclusion; one could also conclude that he did not since (again accepting Chambers’s “life preserver” thesis) he did not forward the State Department microfilm which was stamped received January 14, 1938.

Third, Weinstein too easily dismisses the possibility that Chambers might have received the microfilm from Julian Wadleigh (though surely not the handwritten notes of the typed pages) by emphasizing that Wadleigh had left for Turkey in March 1938. That some of the microfilm documents were of carbons and not the originals (to which Hiss would have had direct access) and as well that these documents were received in January makes this contention less than convincing.

Fourth, Weinstein refers in passing to the FBI interview with Lore, wherein the ex-Communist informed FBI agents that Chambers had asked him to hold on to a packet of “life preserver” material for several months after his (Chambers’s) defection and which Chambers eventually removed from Lore’s care and deposited with his nephew. Weinstein fails to pursue this matter. We know that FBI agents interviewed Chambers in 1941 on the basis of this Lore interview although Chambers originally thought that the interview had been precipitated by his 1939 Berle interview. What is contained in the report of the FBI interview with Chambers? Did FBI agents query Chambers about this Lore admission? And did FBI agents at subsequent interviews (but prior to November 1948) ask Chambers about this life preserver?

Fifth, Weinstein emphasizes particularly the defense report of Hiss’s early December 1948 recollection that he had given a “machine” to Pat Catlett at a time when the Hisses were “feigning” ignorance or giving “misleading” testimony to the grand jury and to the FBI. From this, Weinstein concludes that Hiss “deliberately misled” the FBI, the grand jury, and two trial juries about his knowledge of the Woodstock’s whereabouts. On the one hand, the document which Weinstein cites does not establish that sweeping a conclusion. It reports only Hiss’s request that Davis “check on” an old machine which Hiss had remembered giving Pat Catlett. One can conclude from this that Hiss was not definite in his recollection or that Hiss while willing to assist his defense effort was not willing to assist the case of the prosecution.

Hiss’s faulty memory or uncooperativeness, however, is not the central issue to the case. It could explain why the defense would produce the Woodstock at the first trial despite the considerable effort and resources applied by the FBI in the effort to uncover it. Yet, by focusing exclusively on this issue, Weinstein neglects to consider one of the most troubling aspects of the Hiss case: the question of who first found the typewriter. We need to explain the frequency of the claim that the FBI or HUAC first found the typewriter. For, if in fact the FBI first found the typewriter, and then lost it to be refound by the Hiss defense, then Hiss’s claim of “forgery by typewriter” cannot be lightly dismissed. Elsewhere, Weinstein has cited FBI documents detailing FBI Director Hoover’s ire over the failure of FBI agents to uncover the Woodstock. These documents do not settle the matter conclusively; to the skeptic they merely confirm Hoover’s consistent practice of papering the record. In another publication, Professor Peter Irons has related an interview with an unnamed FBI agent who alleges that the Bureau had first found the typewriter. We need to learn the name of this agent as well as learning what evidence he can provide to substantiate this contention.

Sixth, Weinstein reports the fact that Wadleigh, Reno, and Crane had during the 1930s provided secret documents to Chambers and further that Inslerman admitted that he had filmed State Department documents for Chambers. This evidence established that Chambers was acting as a courier in an espionage operation during the 1930s. What Weinstein fails to consider is the nature of this operation and the troubling question it poses concerning Chambers’s 1948 stance. As Inslerman recounts, this was a microfilming operation. Wadleigh has testified as to the nature of his activities; namely, that he provided Chambers only with actual documents to be microfilmed, which were delivered through pre-arranged signal and clandestinely.

This contrasts strikingly with the Hiss material—for Chambers received (allegedly) handwritten notes and typed pages, and these (as the documents which were microfilmed) were delivered weekly to Chambers during his visits to the Hiss residences. Two troubling questions immediately are posed. Why would Chambers receive handwritten notes and typed documents, and receive them through regular weekly meetings at the Hiss residence? Such practices were harmful to an ongoing espionage operation. And, when compiling his safety valve, why did Chambers retain only materials he alleges to have received from Hiss and not as well documents from Wadleigh, Reno, Crane?

These last questions, I think constitute the heart of the case. Was it merely fortuitous that of the twenty individuals who Chambers named to the FBI in 1941 the one who boldly challenged his credibility and further brought a libel suit should be the only one who could prove to be vulnerable to the Chambers “life preserver” in 1948? Is it merely fortuitous that Chambers could produce three different types of documents in 1948, which if raising questions about an espionage operation could serve to secure a conviction in a trial? Had Chambers possessed microfilm alone that could not have established Hiss’s guilt; the handwritten notes combined with the typed documents did establish a Hiss-Chambers connection.

Let me now address Weinstein’s research deficiencies, and particularly why I find it amazing that Weinstein could have concluded “long before the FBI files were open to me” that Hiss was guilty. The FBI files are a potentially rich collection, which need to be used intelligently and carefully. There are necessarily many questions about these files, and the considerable delay Professor Weinstein encountered in obtaining the files and the restrictions imposed on the released material have only heightened these concerns. Thus, whereas the Bureau had gratuitously observed that its files on Hiss totaled 53,000 pages, the number of pages it finally released on January 31, 1976, totaled only over 15,000 pages with the Bureau claiming FOIA exceptions for another 1,500 pages plus. We need a convincing explanation for this rather large margin of error (35,000 pages) and as well to learn what is contained in the excepted pages.

Elsewhere in this letter I have commented on the need to discuss the FBI interview of 1941 with Chambers and to explore whether the FBI followed up on Lore’s assertion that Chambers had kept a “life preserver” packet. We also need to know what Chambers had told the FBI over the years. At issue, here, is not only Chambers’s veracity (centering on his abrupt reversal of the charges he leveled against Hiss) but on the FBI/Chambers relationship. Did the FBI provide Chambers with information about Hiss and what kinds of questions did it ask of Chambers?