WORKS DRAWN ON FOR THIS ARTICLE
a briefing paper, July 30, 2003
Princeton University Press, 240 pp., $24.95
Pluto, 254 pp., $69.95
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003
Council on Foreign Relations, 1999
I.B. Tauris, 241 pp., $24.95
Strategic Studies Institute,US Army War College, August 2002
A visitor trying to discover who controls Lebanon's south, the heartland of Lebanese Shiism, soon finds that Hezbollah flags fly from the wreckage of demolished tanks abandoned by the Israeli army when it withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. The smiling face of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the prominent Shiite cleric who is Hezbollah's political leader, is ubiquitous, and posters of Hezbollah's 'martyrs'—guerrilla soldiers who died fighting Israeli occupation troops—hang from utility poles along the main roads. These images are sometimes accompanied by detailed descriptions of the fighters' final 'operations'—guerrilla ambushes on Israeli troops and military installations, occasionally in the form of suicide bombings. (Although Hezbollah is notorious for having developed suicide bomb attacks in the 1980s, the group has used the tactic sparingly, unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The last known Hezbollah suicide attack in southern Lebanon was in 1995).[1]
Review, 5114 words
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