BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE
St. Martin's, 258 pp., $24.95
Yale University Press, 361 pp., $28.00; $17.00 (paper)
University of California Press, 298 pp., $24.95
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 35 pp., available at www.carnegieendowment.org
New York Review Books, 230 pp., $22.95
Doubleday, 272 pp., $24.95
Throughout the Bush years in Washington, the issue of what to do about Iran was often reduced to a question of whether or not to talk to the Iranian regime. Those who insisted on silence saw Iran starkly as a 'state sponsor of terrorism,' controlled by fanatics grimly bent on making atom bombs. Only the threat of force, they claimed, could persuade Iran to change its ways or, better yet, to change its nature as an Islamic republic. An opposing camp declared that America would be wiser to accept Iran as a regional power and to encourage pragmatic elements within its leadership. Their hope was to build trust through diplomacy so that Iran would not feel the need for a nuclear deterrent. The ideal outcome would be a Grand Bargain based on the common interest of forging a more secure Middle East.
Review, 5123 words
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