De Gaulle, in 1958, gave France a constitution that left the experts puzzled. It was a hybrid: part presidential, since the chief executive, with wide powers, is elected by universal suffrage and cannot be turned out by Parliament; and part parliamentary, since the president has to appoint a prime minister supported (or at least not opposed by) a majority of the National Assembly. The two questions that this arrangement raised were, first, whether it would outlive General De Gaulle, for whom it seemed tailor-made—his very mixed experience as head of the government in 1944 and 1945 had taught him that he needed a capable intermediary in the form of a prime minister who would handle both the details of policy and the politics of dealing with parties and Parliament. Secondly, how would the relationship between the president and the prime minister evolve if the constitution survived the general's departure?
Feature, 8593 words
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