Q&A: Peter Galbraith

Peter Galbraith answered questions from readers about his article "Iraq: The Way To Go," published in the August 16, 2007 issue of The New York Review of Books. Selected questions are posted below along with Mr. Galbraith's replies.

Peter Galbraith, a former US Ambassador to Croatia, is the author of The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, which has just been published in paperback.

The Biden Plan

I like both your earlier proposal to cut Iraq into three parts and your current proposal to withdraw US troops to Kurdistan. Have you given up on the former as too difficult? What do you think of Biden's version of it?

Kevin Cahill, Albuquerque, NM

Peter Galbraith replies: To make a subtle distinction, I have never advocated that the US divide Iraq into three parts. I believe Iraq has already partitioned itself and that the US should get out of the fruitless business of trying to put it back together. Kurdistan is already a separate entity under Iraq's Constitution. In my view, it would be a better outcome to have Sunni and Shiite Regions as part of a tripartite partition, but I don't believe the US can impose such a solution. Right now, it seems more likely that the Sunnis and Shiites will fight their civil war for control of Arab Iraq to the bitter end, which certainly means a Shiite victory. But, for the reasons outlined in my article, I believe we should leave troops in Kurdistan regardless of what happens in Arab Iraq.

The differences between what I propose and the Biden Plan are relatively few. He believes it is possible to have more central institutions than I think are possible and he holds out hope that the division of Iraq would, like Bosnia, ultimately lead to a sustainable state. I don't think Iraq can be saved as a state, nor do I think it should be. But, both our plans have one thing in common. They are based on the realities of Iraq.

The Next Administration, China, Israel and Palestine

1. I believe President Bush has the lost trust of the people as well as the leadership of the Middle East, and only a fresh face in the White House would be able to convince the world that a change in Iraq is not only needed, but also convincingly possible. What advice do you offer to the next American administration in order to better handle the war in Iraq? Do you see Iran and Syria playing a role in this advice? What kind?

Fadi Elsalameen, Founder, Voice of Arab Youth

Peter Galbraith replies: My advice to the next President is quite simple: Focus US efforts in Iraq on the achievable. A war fought to achieve a democratic, unified and reasonably stable Iraq (how Bush defines the current mission) cannot be won because the goal is unattainable for the reasons I outline in my article. I would urge the next President to focus on what is achievable: preserving Kurdistan's aspiring democracy, disrupting al-Qaeda, and preventing Iran from dominating all of Iraq.

Iran, which has emerged as the big winner in Iraq, has almost the same goal as President Bush. Both want Iraq's Shiite-led government to succeed—Iran because its best friends in the world are now Iraq's government and Bush because he has no alternative. I would certainly advise the next President to talk to Iran and Syria, but mostly about the more serious issues that divide our countries.

With regard to your second question, China (and India) have both been looking for energy supplies to fuel their booming economies. I don't see their gains coming necessarily at US expense, although there is no doubt US prestige has suffered greatly in the Middle East and elsewhere due to the mismanaged Iraq War.

I hope the President will now do something to promote an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, not because of Iraq but for its own sake. The Baker-Hamilton Commission was wrong to argue that an Israel-Palestine peace would help solve a Sunni-Shiite civil war just as the Iraq war's neo-conservative architects were wrong to argue that the road to peace between Israel and its neighbors went through Baghdad.

Kurdish Democracy

There is an assumption in your article that the Kurdish part of Iraq is fully democratic with functioning institutions. However, this assumption disregards the realities on the ground which indicate a tribal domination of a highly corrupt regime rather than a pluralistic democracy. A closer look in to the Iraqi Kurdistan politics would reveal a much more nuanced picture. Also curiously enough, there was not a single mentioning of the oil rich city of Kirkuk in your article. The reactions from the Arabs—both Sunni and Shia—and Turkomans to a possible Kurdish fait accompli take-over of the city would cement the opposition to US presence in the country. This implies an inevitable transfer of insurgency tactics in to the northern part of the country against the US and Peshmerga. In your formula for solution, would the US be in a position to grasp the nettle after alienating a crucial ally—Turkey—after taking sides with the Barzani clan?

Ufuk Gezer, Kabil, Afghanistan

Peter Galbraith replies: Kurdistan is not a perfect democracy, as its leaders readily admit. Kurdistan, however, is not the only place in the world where a few families have an outsized role in the political process. This even happens in the most advanced democracies.

In assessing Kurdistan's democracy, I think it is important to keep in mind what has been achieved in the face of enormous obstacles. When the March 1991 uprising and subsequent allied intervention freed most of Kurdistan from Iraqi control, the Kurds had no institutions, no economy, and no source of revenue. In the face of international isolation (from 1991 to 2003, Kurdistan was subject to the same sanctions as the rest of Iraq) and with Saddam's Army right next door, the Kurds held Iraq's first ever free elections in 1992, established a parliament and government, created new newspapers and television stations, built an army that was the main US ally in the 2003 war, rebuilt four thousand of the five thousand villages leveled by Saddam Hussein and established two thousand new schools and two new universities (under Saddam Kurdistan had just one university and one thousand schools). Since 2003, Kurdistan has evolved as the one stable and economically booming part of Iraq. While unemployment in Arab Iraq hovers around 35 percent, Kurdistan is actually importing labor.

Kurdistan is relatively tolerant and much more progressive than Arab Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has actively promoted the rights of women and religious minorities. Women are a majority of the students in Suleimani's university and the government provides financial subsidies to build Christian churches (but not for mosques). In the 1990s, the two Kurdish political parties fought a deadly civil war but now relations between Barzani's KDP and Talabani's PUK are very good and they have worked together to build a unified Kurdistan Administration and to promote Kurdistan's interests in Baghdad.

There are, of course, many problems. Corruption is one issue but more important is the uneven economic development as between Kurdistan's booming cities and the countryside. The media are relatively free but television is dominated by the political parties.

My article was about the benchmarks not intended as a survey of all current Iraq issues. I agree that Kirkuk is a potential time bomb, but there is no easy solution. Iraq's constitution (adopted with almost unanimous Shiite and Kurdish support) provides for a referendum on its status at the end of the year, which the Kurds appear likely to win. This would place Kirkuk's Arab and Turcoman minorities under Kurdistan's authority, which most don't want. However, not holding the referendum would leave Kirkuk's Kurdish majority ruled by Arab Iraqis, which they don't want. These two positions are not easily reconciled and, unfortunately, the Bush Administration has done almost nothing to try to negotiate power sharing and other arrangements that might make the referendum's outcome less painful for the losing side.

US Intelligence and al-Qaeda

Thank you for your well-informed and persuasive article. I do have one question about the idea, with which you seem to be in agreement, that we maintain a residual force, presumably in the Kurdish area, to go after al-Qaeda. Even those in favor of early substantial troop withdrawals suggest that we do this. While I don't think American troop presence in Kurdistan would provoke the same Muslim anger as in Iraq proper, no one has explained how we will know who the "al-Qaeda" people are. Without firm on-the-ground intelligence we are likely to end up using the kind of air bombardment tactics that are being used in Afghanistan, resulting in killing too many people or the wrong people, thus provoking the same kind of anger that these have caused there. Do you have a solution to this problem?

Steve Rolnick

Peter Galbraith replies: Thanks for your kind words about my article. Leaving a small force in Kurdistan should not significantly degrade our intelligence because it is already very poor. If we knew who al-Qaeda was, we would have defeated the insurgency long ago. The Kurdistan security services are quite good and a closer collaboration may actually improve some of our intelligence. But, the real issue is how we act on the intelligence that we have, and this does not depend on the location of our troops. Whether our forces are based in Kurdistan or Arab Iraq, I would hope we would not strike targets unless we had a high degree of confidence that they were terrorists. Our mistakes make enemies that provide new recruits to the terrorist side.

Al-Dawa, SIIC, and the Iraqi Parliament

1. Would you please succinctly detail the history and the nature of Al-Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, previously known as SCIRI)?

Tim Lighthiser, San Francisco, CA

Peter Galbraith replies: 1. Dawa ("the Call") is the oldest of the Iraqi Shiite Parties, having been founded in 1957 or 1958. It is now split among three factions. SIIC, formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was founded by Iran in Teheran in 1982 as umbrella organization of the Iraqi Shiite opposition to Saddam. Both SCIRI and Dawa supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War and Iran created and funded SCIRI's military arm (the Badr Corps) that fought alongside Iran.

2. I would rate the loyalty of Iraq's Parliament to the US at 1, which is only slightly lower than the rating I would give for its loyalty to Iraq.

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