Contrary to the claims in the paper, the regression evidence does not test any well-specified hypothesis, and the correlations that are interpreted as causal effects are really no more than correlations…. It is too early to jump to policy conclusions.9
I am forced to make a similar criticism of Collier’s book—he fails to establish that the measures he recommends will lead to the desired outcomes. In fairness to Collier, it is very difficult to demonstrate causal effects with the kind of data we have available to us on civil wars and failing states. As Collier writes, “our model cannot be used for prediction.” In the research papers on which his book is based, Collier does give abundant caveats that show he understands the limits of correlations for inferring that actions cause outcomes. But the caveats are not as apparent in the book, and Collier does not explain to the reader just why he recommends precise actions so confidently on the basis of mere correlations.
Of course, governments take many actions even when social scientists are unable to establish that such actions will cause certain desirable outcomes. Presumably they use some kind of political judgment that is not based on statistical analysis. What is unusual about Collier’s book is that he seems to offer statistical analysis as a replacement for political judgment, or perhaps unintentionally gives scholarly cover for actions that governments want to take anyway. The press shows a certain reverence for social science work with statistics that can make this cover quite effective. The paradox is that many social scientists familiar with this kind of analysis do not share the press’s reverence.
This is not the end of the pitfalls of social science research that Collier encounters. An important part of his argument is that the Bottom Billion will not get out of poverty by themselves, because they are “trapped” by their pervasive wars, military coups, and looting of natural resource wealth. There certainly is an element of truth in this argument—all of these factors are undeniably inhibiting Africa’s growth. But are those at the “bottom” literally trapped, waiting for outside rescue by the G-8?
Collier comes perilously close to another statistical fallacy known as selection bias. He chose the countries that belong to his Bottom Billion on the basis of their poverty today, and then points out that they also have had very poor growth during the preceding four decades—as has been the case, for example, with Angola, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zaire/ Congo. The implication is that the poorest nations will in the future continue to have very low economic growth.
But there is actually no evidence that the Bottom Billion at the beginning of a forty-year period will have worse economic growth over the subsequent forty years than rich nations. What Collier did was select which countries are poor at the end of the period, so of course they will also be the ones that previously have had a long string of very low growth rates—if they had previously had high economic growth, then they wouldn’t be poor at the end.
Of course, Collier is quite right to show compassion for those countries that have had such negative growth as to wind up at the bottom today. Perhaps he worries that this negative record is likely to continue indefinitely. Yet the historical evidence suggests that this is an ungrounded assumption—growth reversals among poor nations are common in both directions. Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, and Zimbabwe had good growth between 1960 and 1980, before falling prey to economic decline—brought on by political disasters and other factors—from 1980 to the present. Conversely, Bangladesh, India, Uganda, and Vietnam had mediocre to negative growth between 1960 and 1980, before registering impressive growth from 1980 to the present. If there is so much movement into and out of success and failure, it is hard to argue looking forward that the Bottom Billion are trapped in failure.
These may sound like arcane statistical debates when you are trying to decide whether to save a poor country. But if you are going to recommend military intervention based on social science research—in short, if you are going to read Collier’s book and draw conclusions from it—then you have to face up to the technical fallacies that may lurk behind research findings. Alas, we have now seen two common fallacies appearing in the book, “correlation equals causation” (which spuriously concluded that UN peacekeeping forces cause peace) and “selection bias” (which made it appear that the Bottom Billion were trapped in low income and low growth, when no such conclusion is established by historical evidence).
These technical fallacies in Collier’s analysis also raise questions concerning his conclusions about when and how to use military force or any other kind of foreign intervention. He illustrates his statistical results with anecdotal examples of military intervention, as we have already seen, as possible precedents for future military action. He strongly supports the widespread view that Western intervention could have prevented the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Rwanda is certainly a tragic case that discredits the inaction of the international community before and during the genocide. It is hard to consider the horrific killings that took place and not wish that there had been foreign military intervention there.
Yet the argument that the genocide could easily have been averted presumes that there was some benevolent rapid response force available that had full information about what was happening on the ground and was unconstrained by international politics. The tragedies of the last two decades have made clear that no such force now exists—whether in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, or Darfur. On Darfur, we have now had years of activism, denunciations, and negotiations, and still no effective force in the field to protect civilians. There were UN peacekeepers in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, but they were hamstrung by doubts about whether what was occurring was genocide or a civil war and by great-power interests (especially the French, who backed the Hutus for a shamefully long period after the genocide began in order to preserve their Francophone sphere of influence in central Africa). In the end, the UN peacekeepers did nothing as the genocide occurred. Collier does not address the obstacles that have crippled efforts in recent years to build an international humanitarian rescue force.
So both statistical exercises and case study analysis give ambiguous direction on military intervention. I think the moral of the story is that, as tragic as poverty and violence are, social science does not have much to offer as a guide to using military force to stop them. This is not so surprising: Why should social scientists have any strategic expertise on whether a contingent of foreign or international troops will pacify a country easily (Sierra Leone) or with great difficulty, or not at all (Somalia)? It is regrettable if social science is used to give spurious cover to military intervention. There may indeed be cases where humanitarian intervention is desirable. But nobody should rush to embrace the new aid imperialism, in which soldiers and aid workers are supposed to intervene together in a poor society, on the basis of social science research like that presented in The Bottom Billion.
Although the kind of social science deployed by Collier offers little guidance on military intervention, that doesn’t mean that nothing insightful can be said about it. There has already been an extensive debate among thoughtful writers on the subject, to which Collier pays scant attention. This debate is far from resolved, yet it does make clear that humanitarian intervention is not the apolitical and clean exercise Collier envisions, but extremely political and messy. Aid groups like Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF) have complained that military intervention (or even the threat of such intervention) fatally compromises the neutrality of humanitarian aid workers, thus restricting their access to needy people, and sometimes putting the aid workers in danger. In Somalia, attacks on aid workers increased after American troops arrived. Aid workers were expelled from Kosovo after NATO started bombing Serbia. Pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor attacked humanitarian workers because they saw them as favoring East Timor’s secession.
In the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the military’s dispensing of aid made it hard to tell the difference between military and nonmilitary aid workers, and the latter had to temporarily withdraw in the face of violence. And in recent months, as Afghanistan descends further into full-scale civil war, aid workers have lamented what they call the “securitization” of US development and reconstruction assistance, according to which most US aid has been channeled to some of the principal areas of military conflict in the south where it has little effect, rather than to more stable areas that have capacity for development. “How will the Afghan population know in the future if an offer of humanitarian aid does not hide a military operation?” asked MSF’s Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol.
These warnings seem even more tragically prescient after the recent assassinations in Afghanistan of three expatriate International Rescue Committee workers on August 13, 2008, and of a British aid worker on October 20, 2008. “We have seen many times before, for example in Somalia, the problems caused for both the vulnerable population and for aid agencies when the military try to both fight a war and deliver aid at the same time.”10
In Darfur, advocacy by NGOs of military action against the Sudanese government has led that government to refuse to grant those NGOs access to Darfuri refugees. Both pro- and anti-government forces have physically or sexually assaulted or even killed aid workers because of their perceived complicity with military operations. This is particularly unfortunate because Darfur badly needs humanitarian workers to prevent the 70 percent of deaths that are caused by disease and malnutrition, not violence. The Save Darfur coalition called for a “no-fly” zone in Darfur even though it would have put humanitarian aid flights in danger.
As far as ending the Darfur tragedy, the Darfur expert and veteran humanitarian worker Alex de Waal notes that the diplomatic energies of the United States and its allies have been consumed by the “clamor for UN troops,” that such a force would not be adequate to protect civilians anyway, and that the clamor is “diverting efforts from achieving a peace agreement that was within grasp…but has now slipped away.”11
Moreover, once blanket endorsement of a humanitarian war is given, what is to prevent a great power from using that endorsement as cover for a war it pursues for its own reasons? Many humanitarian advocates accepted the Kosovo war, but then US Secretary of State Colin Powell was able to claim in October 2002 that the United States had the same authority to use force in Iraq that it had in Kosovo. Critics later wondered whether the Kosovo operation was motivated as much by NATO strategy designed to isolate Serbia in Europe as by the plight of the Kosovars. UN peacekeeping deployments are also controlled by the great powers at the Security Council. Developing countries have been a lot less enthusiastic than great powers about giving those powers a blank check to invade any country they define as a human rights violator. The Filipino activist Walden Bello said that “you begin with a Haiti or a Kosovo, and you end up with an Iraq.”
I confess that I am still moved as much as anyone else by the compassionate case for saving civilians from horrific violence. But we have to ask the tough questions: Even if the war proceeds from humanitarian motives, does it actually have humanitarian consequences? It’s not so simple. The guarantee of international protection may cause civilians at risk to let down their guard, and then tragedy ensues when the guarantee turns out to be an empty one (Srebrenica, Rwanda). The political scientist Alan Kuperman points out that killers are much quicker than interveners—in Bosnia, most ethnic cleansing happened in the spring of 1992 before the Western press was even paying attention.
Kuperman also argues that the hope of international intervention may embolden rebels to undertake military action that will inevitably catch many civilians in the crossfire between the rebels and the government before the interveners arrive. This is exactly what happened with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose members admitted in interviews with Kuperman that their violence against Serbs starting in 1997 was motivated by hopes of foreign intervention. What’s more, Western military strategists may unintentionally favor violent over nonviolent resistance movements. The West ignored a nonviolent Kosovar resistance movement for eight years, and then rewarded the violent KLA with military backing in the NATO Kosovo war.
A larger-scale Western military intervention may lead to an escalation of violence on all sides and much more loss of civilian life. As Columbia professor of government Mahmood Mamdani wonders, “Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn out to be a trigger that escalates rather than reduces the level of violence as intervention in Iraq has done?”12 University of Chicago law professor Eric Posner points out that a smart tyrant can foil a humanitarian invasion by using civilians as human shields, inducing the invaders to kill those they are trying to save (remember Somalia?).13
One should never say never—there may be cases where foreign forces can rescue innocents from horrors. But as generalized doctrine, as Alex de Waal says eloquently, “philanthropic imperialism is imperial nonetheless.” In the end, one cannot hide all the political and ethical complexities of foreign military intervention behind a neutral façade of Collier-type statistical analysis. The hubris of the military imperialists was bad enough without adding to it the hubris of the aid imperialists.
—November 6, 2008
Acemoglu was commenting on Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War, Vols. 1 and 2 (World Bank, 2003). The comments came as part of a 2006 evaluation by academic economists (led by Angus Deaton of Princeton) of the World Bank's research, including that on civil war. The evaluation characterized the World Bank's work as a case in which "an important and promising topic was marred by poor execution." See An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998–2005, September 24, 2006, p. 64. Nevertheless, the World Bank Web site today notes that "in 2005, following on the success of the Economics of Civil War project, the World Bank launched the Post- Conflict Transitions research project." The hubris of social scientists working for aid agencies like the World Bank and the hubris of military interventionists seem to be reinforcing each other.↩
Médecins Sans Frontières, "MSF Rejects Link of Humanitarian and Military Actions," October 8, 2001.↩
"No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the 'Responsibility to Protect' in Wartime," Harvard International Review, March 21, 2007.↩
"The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency," London Review of Books, March 8, 2007.↩
"The Humanitarian War Myth," The Washington Post, October 1, 2006.↩
‘Foreign Aid Goes Military!’ July 2, 2009
Acemoglu was commenting on Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War, Vols. 1 and 2 (World Bank, 2003). The comments came as part of a 2006 evaluation by academic economists (led by Angus Deaton of Princeton) of the World Bank’s research, including that on civil war. The evaluation characterized the World Bank’s work as a case in which “an important and promising topic was marred by poor execution.” See An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998–2005, September 24, 2006, p. 64. Nevertheless, the World Bank Web site today notes that “in 2005, following on the success of the Economics of Civil War project, the World Bank launched the Post- Conflict Transitions research project.” The hubris of social scientists working for aid agencies like the World Bank and the hubris of military interventionists seem to be reinforcing each other.↩
Médecins Sans Frontières, “MSF Rejects Link of Humanitarian and Military Actions,” October 8, 2001.↩
“No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Wartime,” Harvard International Review, March 21, 2007.↩
“The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” London Review of Books, March 8, 2007.↩
“The Humanitarian War Myth,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2006.↩